Innovation & Tech

CISA Sat Four Years on Report Warning of Telecom Spy Flaws

CISA sat four years on a 2022 report warning of 'major structural vulnerabilities' in US telecom networks. Salt Typhoon hackers later probed the same SS7 flaws it flagged.

By Daniel Okafor

4 min read

US Was Warned of Telecoms Risk Years Before Salt Typhoon Hack
US Was Warned of Telecoms Risk Years Before Salt Typhoon Hackblickpixel / pixabay

What's News

  • A June 2022 CISA-commissioned report found 'major structural vulnerabilities' in US telecom networks; CISA withheld it for four years.
  • Salt Typhoon breached at least nine major US telecom and broadband providers, including Verizon, AT&T and Lumen.
  • The report logged 9,000 suspicious incidents across US phone networks in one week of May 2022.
  • It was based on review of up to 50 billion daily telecom events and called the US the world's most targeted country for telecom protocol exploits.
  • Senator Ron Wyden said earlier publication could have enabled mandatory cybersecurity standards 'in time to prevent the Salt Typhoon hacks.'

By Daniel Okafor

A June 2022 report commissioned by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency concluded that US telecom networks contained "major structural vulnerabilities" — and CISA then fought for four years to keep it secret, according to interviews and documents reviewed by Bloomberg News.

The 111-page report, titled "US telecommunications insecurity 2022," warned of a "perilous" national security situation more than two years before the suspected Chinese hacking group Salt Typhoon breached at least nine major US telecom and broadband providers, including Verizon, AT&T and Lumen Technologies. The intruders targeted the phones of top politicians, including then presidential candidate Donald Trump, in what US officials called one of the worst cyber espionage cases in recent history.

What did the suppressed report actually say?

It focused largely on SS7, or Signaling System 7, a switchboard protocol developed in the 1970s that routes communications between phone networks and carries known flaws that governments and private surveillance firms have exploited to spy on calls, texts and locations.

The report's findings rest on a review of up to 50 billion daily "telecom events." It concluded the US was the most targeted country in the world for cyber exploits against telecom protocols. Outdated regulation and the fragmentation of the US market — many operators, including small rural carriers with varying security — created more "entry points" for attackers, it said. Firewalls exist that block SS7 surveillance, but operators do not deploy them uniformly.

"The fact that US national networks can be readily compromised from anywhere in the world is not yet widely understood," the report states.

The redacted version, disclosed through a lawsuit by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, still contains hard numbers:

  • 9,000 suspicious incidents across US phone networks in one week of May 2022, linked to several unnamed "malicious entities."
  • A March 2022 case in which an individual carrying a Cyprus-registered device was surveilled while apparently in Indianapolis, attributed to an unnamed nation-state agency.
  • An April 2022 attempt against phones linked to three people in the US to "covertly acquire the locations of the devices involved."

Who used the flaws — and how?

Salt Typhoon hackers used SS7 for some early reconnaissance, according to a former US official familiar with the breaches, but did not exploit it to gain network access. Two former officials said so on condition of anonymity.

The report also traces live abuse. Texas-based Choice Wireless was detected transporting "malicious signaling traffic" — surveillance attempts such as eavesdropping and location tracking. Two people familiar with the report said Choice was flagged over a commercial relationship with Cypriot-Israeli firm Inno Networks, whose chairman co-founded the surveillance company Circles, which advocacy groups say has sold phone-spying services to authoritarian governments. The report says small US operators leased network infrastructure to foreign entities that used it as a cloak to hide their identities while exploiting SS7. It remains unclear whether Choice knew. Choice, Inno and Circles did not respond to requests for comment.

AdaptiveMobile Security, a unit of Sweden's Enea AB, and Telecom Defense produced the study for CISA.

Why did CISA bury it?

Kevin Briggs, a former senior CISA official who commissioned the report, said superiors blocked his push to publish it because release would damage the agency's relationship with the telecom industry, given the report's criticism and calls for regulation.

"Telecommunication is entwined with all of our infrastructure — it's business intelligence, it's national security, it's financial," said Briggs, who was laid off from CISA last year amid cuts by Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency. "If you can get into telecommunication networks and monitor or disrupt, you can potentially get into everything. We have to fix these things."

In court, CISA argued the report was privileged and exempt from disclosure, and said it did not adopt its recommendations because "it makes technical claims without presenting the supporting information necessary to verify the claims." A CISA spokesperson declined to comment. Brian Collins, who led Enea's AdaptiveMobile unit at the time, said CISA staff could have verified the evidence "with a couple of simple phone calls."

Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, briefed in 2023, said: "Had this report been made public when it was first written in 2022, Congress would have had ample time to require mandatory cybersecurity standards for phone companies, in time to prevent the Salt Typhoon hacks." This week he added: "It is totally inexcusable that CISA stonewalled releasing this report for four years, while adversaries were spying on Americans."

EPIC's Jeramie Scott said the government "knows these vulnerabilities are actively being exploited by bad actors" and has "seemingly spent more effort trying to keep this report from the public than trying to protect the public against these known risks." Industry group CTIA said the report contains nothing new: "SS7 is not used in the 4G or 5G networks that Americans rely on daily for connectivity," it said, adding the flaw has been addressed through best practices.

What happens now?

The report's authors say the problem has only grown. "The uncomfortable reality is that weaknesses in telecom networks have been exploited for years," said Enea's John Hughes. "Pretending otherwise doesn't make networks safer." With no mandatory cybersecurity standards for phone carriers in place, the question Congress now faces is whether Salt Typhoon supplies the pressure that the 2022 report did not.

Source: insurancejournal.com

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Daniel Okafor

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Correspondent covering money, funding and market shifts around entrepreneurship, startups and venture funding at Business Bearings.

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