Handpickd Grew Revenue 3.3X to Rs 28.6 Cr — and Still Lost Rs 43 Cr
Handpickd's FY26 revenue jumped 3.3X to Rs 28.6 crore, but procurement costs of Rs 28.9 crore swallowed nearly every rupee of product sales as losses widened to Rs 43.1 crore.
By Grace Kim
3 min read

What's News
- Handpickd's FY26 operating revenue grew 3.3X to Rs 28.6 crore from Rs 8.7 crore in FY25 (RoC filings).
- Net loss widened 3.85X to Rs 43.1 crore in FY26 from Rs 11.2 crore in FY25.
- Procurement costs of Rs 28.9 crore nearly equaled product sales of Rs 28.6 crore, leaving almost no gross margin.
- The company raised a $15 million Series A during FY26.
- Rivals Otipy, Fraazo and Deep Rooted shut down after raising $49M, $61M and $20M respectively.
Handpickd booked Rs 28.6 crore in operating revenue in FY26 — a 3.3X jump from Rs 8.7 crore in FY25 — but its net loss widened almost as fast, to Rs 43.1 crore from Rs 11.2 crore, according to the Gurugram startup's annual financial statements filed with the Registrar of Companies (RoC).
The numbers land months after the company closed a $15 million Series A round. That raise came despite a brutal stretch for the farm-to-fresh segment, where several competitors shut down despite sizeable backing.
How does the model work?
Founded in 2024 by Anant Goel, co-founder of Milkbasket, along with Nitin Gupta and Sahil Madan, Handpickd runs an inventory-free operation. It has no warehouses and no dark stores. Instead of forecasting demand and stocking products, the company collects customer orders, procures the exact quantities from farmers, and delivers the next morning.
That structure could keep wastage and inventory holding costs in check. But the FY26 filings show how thin the economics still are. Product sales remained the company's only source of operating revenue; Handpickd added Rs 1.2 crore in interest income from deposits, bringing total income to Rs 29.8 crore in FY26, up from Rs 8.91 crore in FY25.
Where did the money go?
Procurement of materials was the largest cost line, at nearly 40% of total expenditure. That expense surged 3.7X to Rs 28.9 crore in FY26 from Rs 7.7 crore in FY25.
The rest of the cost base scaled alongside it:
- Employee benefit expenses nearly tripled to Rs 13 crore
- Packaging and delivery expenses stood at Rs 12 crore
- Total expenditure jumped 3.6X to Rs 72.9 crore from Rs 20.1 crore
At the unit level, Handpickd spent Rs 2.55 to earn a single rupee of operating revenue in FY26 — worse than Rs 2.31 in FY25.
What does the margin picture look like?
Here's the number that matters most: procurement costs of Rs 28.9 crore were almost exactly equal to product revenue of Rs 28.6 crore. That leaves virtually no gross margin before a rupee goes to packaging, delivery, employee benefits or advertising.
Two explanations fit. Either Handpickd is pricing products aggressively — effectively discounting as a customer acquisition strategy — or it hasn't yet built the procurement scale to improve unit economics. The filings don't say which, but both paths carry risk. Discounting is expensive to sustain; weak procurement economics are expensive to fix.
Can Handpickd survive where rivals didn't?
The segment's track record argues for caution. Otipy shut down after raising $49 million. Fraazo closed after $61 million. Deep Rooted folded after $20 million. Pluckk, another player, raised $10 million in a fresh round and keeps operating.
All of them faced the same structural problems that have defined farm-to-fresh since the category emerged: high wastage, limited room for expansion, and the difficulty of building a sustainable supply chain at scale.
Handpickd's inventory-free model is a genuine attempt to answer those problems — you can't write off spoiled stock you never held. But zero inventory doesn't eliminate the margin question; it just moves it upstream to what the company pays farmers versus what customers pay at checkout.
The metric to watch in FY27 and beyond is gross margin. If Handpickd can widen the gap between its Rs 28.9 crore procurement bill and its Rs 28.6 crore of sales while holding its next-morning freshness promise, the Series A buys it time to prove the category can work. If it can't, the company joins a graveyard already crowded with better-funded predecessors.
Source: entrackr.com
More from Grace Kim
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Market editor covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in entrepreneurship, startups and venture funding at Business Bearings.
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