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Nvidia Earnings Prove the Company Outgrew Jensen Huang — and Exposed Its Board

Nvidia raised forecasts under interim CEO Colette Kress as the SEC probes ousted founder Jensen Huang, now facing four investigations — and the real failure was board culture, not structure.

By Grace Kim

5 min read

Nvidia’s tutorial on genuine good governance, needed by tech bros and governistas alike
Nvidia’s tutorial on genuine good governance, needed by tech bros and governistas alikeRemazteredStudio / pixabay

What's News

  • Nvidia raised forecasts under interim CEO Colette Kress while the SEC probes Huang and the company
  • Jensen Huang faces 4 ongoing government investigations and multiple shareholder lawsuits
  • Shareholders re-elected all 10 Nvidia directors in June; Huang won 99% of the vote with ISS backing
  • Nvidia has a single-class stock structure — governista critics blamed dual-class shares anyway
  • No Nvidia director has ever run an S&P 500 company; Microsoft, IBM and Dell each have at least four such CEOs on their boards

Nvidia raised its forecasts under interim CEO Colette Kress on earnings day, closing the book on any urgent need to bring back ousted founder Jensen Huang — who now faces four ongoing government investigations and multiple shareholder lawsuits.

New board chair Harvey Jones shut the door definitively on Huang's return as CEO, even as news broke that the SEC is probing both Huang and Nvidia. Kress ran the earnings call with command, presence, and candor, winning plaudits while pointing to underlying business strength far greater than any one individual. Charles de Gaulle's line applies, as the source notes: "The graveyards are filled with indispensable men."

That hasn't stopped a loud fight over what actually went wrong. And according to the Fortune commentary, both sides of that fight are missing the point.

Who is arguing about Nvidia's governance?

Two camps have formed since Huang's ouster this week. A band of tech bros wants him back, blaming "woke" management policies for his exit. Their champion is Telegram founder Pavel Durov, who posted on X: "Jensen made a rookie mistake. He had a board." That skips a fiduciary point: executives entrusted with other people's money owe shareholders first, above self-enrichment.

The other camp — self-declared "governistas" — has offered solutions the author calls irrelevant clichés. The problem with both camps, per the piece: they ignore the real collapse, which was poor CEO judgment matched with faulty character and process in board oversight, not bureaucratic mechanics.

What do the governistas get wrong?

Plenty, by this account. Charlie Elson of the University of Delaware blamed dual-class shares in Directors & Boards — writing "in the end, this may spark, and I hope it does, a real reconsideration of the whole notion of dual-class stock in publicly traded companies." There's one problem: Nvidia has a single-class stock structure and never had dual-class shares. The New York Times repeated the same error.

York University professor Richard LeBlanc proposed an independent chair as the fix — though Nvidia already had an independent lead director, Stephen Neal, former CEO of Cooley Law Firm.

Huang himself fueled the return campaign with an unusual morning statement: "If the Board of Directors decides that my return is in the best interest of our shareholders, our employees, the company, and America, I would be honored to answer these calls and return as CEO." Proxy firm Egan Jones added implicit support, saying "It is not entirely clear the board acted in the best interest of shareholders" — looking past sanctions evasion, national security, and accounting concerns.

Why did the ISS and Glass Lewis checklists miss everything?

Nvidia was a box-checker's showpiece. Every director but Huang was technically independent. It had independent audit, compensation, and governance committees, annual elections with no staggered terms, and one vote per share. Huang wasn't even chairman — Nvidia had no chairman at all until he left. In June, shareholders re-elected all ten directors, with the CEO taking 99% of the vote, and ISS backed the entire slate, as it has for years.

History says the checklist fails. Enron had 12 independent directors among 14, split the chair and CEO roles in its final year, and was named one of America's five best boards in 2000 — right before the fraud surfaced. Silicon Valley Bank had an independent chair. Ten of Lehman Brothers' 11 directors were independent. Stanford researchers tested ISS's flagship rating against five outcome measures, including restatements, shareholder lawsuits, and stock performance, and found no significant correlation.

The dual-class obsession fails the same test: Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Arthur Andersen, Bear Stearns, Lehman, Wirecard, FTX, Silicon Valley Bank, and First Republic Bank all had one-share-one-vote structures. ISS now universally recommends against directors at companies with unequal voting rights, without exception.

What actually failed at Nvidia?

The caliber and culture of the board. No Nvidia director has ever run an S&P 500 company, and none has national security experience — at a company whose chips are a national security asset. Microsoft, IBM, and Dell each have at least four current or former big-company CEOs on their boards; Nvidia had none.

Succession planning was absent. Nobody groomed even an emergency successor for a CEO with more than 60 direct reports, no president or COO beneath him, and a habit of handshake deals that centralized all power in himself. When crisis came, the board's first instinct was to vouch for Huang before its own investigation began.

The board also deferred to advisors PwC and Cooley. PwC signed off on reports with what many experts consider questionable accounting — obfuscating the geographic origins of Nvidia's revenues and end users of sensitive chips — potentially opening directors to oversight-failure or even fraud claims.

As former SEC Chairman Bill Donaldson put it at a Yale CEO Summit: boards are social entities, and "a lot of times, what's really going on bears the seeds of horror stories." Great boards, per the 2002 Harvard Business Review piece "What Makes Great Boards Great," treat dissent as a duty and build trust so management brings bad news early.

Can boards work with visionary founders at all?

Yes — Microsoft, Amazon, Dell, Starbucks, and Apple all did it. Those boards forged alignment with Gates, Bezos, Dell, Schultz, and Jobs, addressing founders' frailties through non-accusatory accountability and credible succession planning, not blind worship or overbearing suffocation.

The takeaway is blunt: no checklist, capital structure, or rulebook can legislate board performance. Nvidia's board could retain and worship Huang, but lacked the stature to contain him — and that, not structure, is the lesson boards should carry forward.

Source: fortune.com

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Grace Kim

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Market editor covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in entrepreneurship, startups and venture funding at Business Bearings.

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